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WHAT IT REALLY MEANS TO SAY "LAW IS
POLITICS": POLITICAL HISTORY AND LEGAL
ARGUMENT IN BUSH v. GORE*
Peter Gabelt
INTRODUCTION
In the early afternoon of December 8, 2000-five weeks
into the national debate about who had won the presidential
election and four days before the United States Supreme Court
settled the matter-San Francisco's 24 Divisidero bus was
making its way along its cross-town route. On the surface,
everything seemed normal on that bus-the passengers
isolated in their passive roles, staring blankly straight ahead
or looking aimlessly out of their windows, each avoiding eye
contact with the other, proceeding along on the conveyor belt of
social alienation that has imprisoned so many of us so much of
the time for the last twenty years.
Then suddenly a big guy in a brown leather jacket got
on the bus at Haight Street and shouted, "The Florida
* ©2002 Peter Gabel. All Rights Reserved.
t Peter Gabel is a law professor at New College Law School, a founder of the
Critical Legal Studies movement, and author of THE BANK TELLER AND OTHER ESSAYS
ON THE POLITICS OF MEANING (2000). An earlier version of this paper was presented at
a panel of the Law and Interpretation Section of the Association of American Law
Schools held in San Francisco, California in January, 2001. The panel was organized to
discuss Steven L. Winter's then forthcoming publication of A Clearing in the Forest:
Law, Life, and Mind. Brooklyn Law School Professor Gary Minda was Chair of the
Law and Interpretation Section at the time.
1 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (holding that standardless manual recounts
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Supreme Court decided for Gore 4-3! "2 Instantly, people leaped
out of their seats, threw their arms around each other and
began dancing for joy, talking to each other and speculating
with new hope that perhaps the forces trying to stop the
Florida vote-count could be defeated. Eventually, everyone
calmed down and took their seats, but they sat closer to each
other than they had before and continued to talk, to connect,
about the election.
Now that we are sealed in the Bush presidency, it is
difficult to remember that in the six weeks between the first
Tuesday in November and December 12, 2000, Something
Happened.3 The chaos of Election Night, the wrong calls of the
networks, Gore's calling Bush to concede and then calling him
back to retract the concession as last-minute Florida vote totals
were phoned in to him in his car, Bush's all too human "Do
what you gotta do" reply oddly undermining the soft-toned halo
with which the media had just presidentialized his televised
likeness as it sought to elevate him from mere personhood to
George Walker Bush, Forty-Third President of the United
States, and then the bafflement of the experts about what was
to happen next and the inability of the television anchors to
anchor anything-all of this accidentally but decisively
disrupted the coherence of what was supposed to be an
institutionalized political ritual of which we the people were
supposed to be passive, numbly enthralled spectators, just as
we had been of the debates and the political ads and the
scripted role-behavior of the candidates leading up to the
election. And with the dissolution of the object comes the
dissolution of the subject-the inability of the election to unfold
as "watched democracy," as a numerical activity of "counting to
a result" that is the only unity that the common product of
isolated and detached voters can have, suddenly and
spontaneously released us en masse from our reciprocal
disconnection as detached spectators and hurled us into a kind
of disorganized and exciting engagement with each other.
Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000) (holding that Gore satisfied his
burden of proof with respect to the Miami-Dade County Canvassing Board's failure to
tabulate, and therefore ordered a hand recount of the 9,000 ballots in Miami-Dade
County).
See JOSEPH HELLER, SOMETHING HAPPENED (1974).
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Rather than being an external and alien process in which each
of us watches who "the others" elect, with each of us being both
observer and "one of the others" in our capacity as voters, the
election suddenly became real because we became real. We
suddenly became The People.
Today, so many months and so much history later, it is
difficult to remember that at that moment, right below the
surface, a majority of Americans really cared about the
outcome of the election and could have been mobilized to insist
that their democratic wish be respected. But that didn't
happen. Instead, in part because of what Al Gore and his
lawyers did, in part because of the success of twenty years of a
conservative assault on our collective hopes and our
willingness to believe in the possibility of a new and more
connected social order, we succumbed in a resigned and
depressive way to an outcome which was neither legitimate nor
desired.
Understanding how we got into this mess is an urgent
task if we are ever to rekindle hope for social change. As the
media bows to Bush and the narrow parameters of the curr6nt
conservative world-view, we have an obligation to not let the
embers of our collective hope be extinguished. We need to
understand exactly how we allowed ourselves to be
disempowered, how we allowed the spirit expressed on that bus
to disappear from public life and from our collective memory of
what was really possible. That's why it's important to go back
and understand the lost opportunity that was Bush v. Gore.4
Most Americans know that there was something wrong
with what the Court did in Bush v. Gore,5 the Supreme Court
decision awarding the presidential election to George Bush.
They know that we are supposed to be living in a democracy
and that it just can't have been legally justified for the Court to
have jumped in and peremptorily declared the winner before
every reasonable effort had been made to count every vote in
every instance where the intent of the voter could reasonably
be determined. This widespread sense that the Court majority
somehow abused its authority was intensified by the manner in




which the Court intervened in the process-overturning the
Florida Supreme Court's first seemingly reasonable and brief
extension of the certification deadline on the basis of some
rarified legal objection that nobody could understand,' and
then a week later blocking a statewide manual recount of
machine-rejected ballots on the basis of a completely different
legal objection not even mentioned the first time they tried to
stop the count from proceeding You didn't need to be a legal
scholar to know that Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, Scalia,
O'Connor, and Kennedy wanted to stop that vote-count and
were intent on finding a legal justification for doing so no
matter what. It is in fact almost impossible to reconcile the two
Court interventions with each other or to find any legal
authority for the election-terminating aspect of the final
decision.'
Yet the meaning of what was "political" about Bush v.
Gore is not that the Supreme Court failed to follow something
called "the rule of law" that is not political. On the contrary. By
going so far beyond the legitimate limits of constitutional
interpretation, the Court made transparent what is usually
mystified-the political nature of all legal reasoning. The
political choices made by the Court were possible because Gore
and his legal team chose to frame the issues in ways that
reinforced a conservative political climate which had been
building for the past thirty years. If we ever hope to move
beyond that triumph of political conservatism, we need to fully
understand how it has become embodied in law and how it
manifests in politics. A perfect place to begin is to see how this
conservatism shaped Gore's legal strategy and guaranteed its
ineffectiveness-and why Gore and others around him couldn't
understand how self-defeating that strategy was.
6 Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
7 See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98.
8 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123. (Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, J.J.,
dissenting).
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I. VOTING RIGHTS, NOT STATES' RIGHTS
The core of the legal position chosen by Gore and his
lawyers was their decision to base their argument for a manual
recount in Florida on "states' rights" rather than on "voting
rights."9 From election night on, it was clear that Gore had won
the popular vote by about 500,000 votes, a margin far greater
than Kennedy's victory over Nixon in 1960 and greater than
Nixon's victory over Humphrey in 1968. Gore had gained this
popular democratic majority through the efforts of blacks,
women, and working people who had come out to vote in large
numbers between 5 p.m. and 8 p.m. all across the country.
These constituencies had all won the right to vote through long
and difficult struggles over the past 200 years. They did so in
the name of the expansion of the ideal of popular democracy as
the very foundation of what it means to be an American.
Whatever criticisms and even cynicism these constituencies
feel toward the American political system, if they share an
idealistic belief about anything in their identification with
being an American, it is that they've got the right to vote, that
they fought for it, and that it's sacred.
Although the text of the Constitution itself does not
guarantee the right to vote, the Fourteenth Amendment,"0 the
Fifteenth Amendment," the Nineteenth Amendment,' and the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 3 as well as a long line of
venerated Supreme Court cases interpreting them, 4 all affirm
that the right to vote is the nation's most sacred political value.
Even though the electoral college has retained its place as the
means for selecting the president-a power granted to it in the
eighteenth century when none of Gore's core constituencies had
yet won the right to vote and when states had no obligation to
(and sometimes did not) hold popular elections for president-
the movement of the last 200 years has unquestionably been
See Brief for Respondent at 43-50, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-
949) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
" U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX
13 U.S. CONST. amend. XX1V.
1 See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (and cases cited therein).
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toward the expansion of popular democracy carried out by
universal suffrage as the basis of political legitimacy.
Against this backdrop, it seems clear that Gore's legal
argument for supporting the Florida Supreme Court's decision
to allow a manual recount, both in the first and second of his
U.S. Supreme Court appeals, 5 should have been that the
constitutional right to vote, and to have one's vote counted, is
more important than more-or-less arbitrary state deadlines.
The central argument of Lawrence Tribe and David Boies
should have been to uphold the Florida Supreme Court on the
grounds that their interpretation of conflicting Florida state
laws-allowing the manual recounts called for in one statute
over another statute imposing a deadline on submitting
certified vote totals that would have made the manual recounts
impossible-reflected not only a normal and inevitable
responsibility of a state Supreme Court to resolve conflicts in
state legislation, but also a responsibility that the Florida
Court carried out in a manner consistent with the highest
value of the Constitution of the United States-namely, that in
a national presidential election especially, the right to vote and
to have one's vote counted must take precedence over
certification deadlines that have little practical or moral
significance. 1
This approach would have aligned Gore's political and
moral claims with his legal claim and mobilized the
constituencies that made up his popular majority. Gore would
have been speaking before the Court in support of the
universal voting rights of all of us in a democracy, including
those of us in the other forty-nine states, rather than making
15 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 98; see also Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 70.
" In failing to assert the centrality of the Constitutional right to vote in
supporting the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of state law, rejecting even the
existence of a federal question and defending only the appropriateness of that Court's
reliance on Florida's state-based right to vote in resolving the statutory conflict, the
Gore argument presented an image of the U.S. Supreme Court as powerless to
authoritatively declare the substantive moral correctness of the Gore position. Thus
had the Florida Supreme Court decided for Bush, Gore's stance would have left the
U.S. Supreme Court powerless to reverse on the basis of the moral pre-eminence of the
constitutional right to vote. The mobilized political moment required Gore to affirm the
Court's Constitutional authority to decide for him in the name of democracy and to
make a 'call" upon the moral and legal responsibility of the Justices to do so. See infra
text accompanying notes 27-29.
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an amoral argument in support of the right of the State of
Florida to not be bound by any such compelling universal
ethical claim. If he had done this, he would have spoken, for
example, for me, one of millions of Nader supporters who voted
for Gore at the last minute to keep Bush out of the White
House. He would have acknowledged my stake, as a California
Gore voter, in whether the manual recount in Florida took
place. This was the time to act-at a moment when the right to
vote had a genuinely utopian, Walt Whitmanesque, democratic
resonance-when the whole country was on the edge of its seat
over a matter suddenly filled with vital political and moral
American importance.
Had Gore argued for voting rights instead of states'
rights, he would have put the Supreme Court in the position of
saying to Gore voters across the country, "No, you don't have
the right to vote" because of some technical rule (whether that
rule was Katherine Harris's deadlines or obscure federal
statutory provisions). If Gore had argued for voting rights, the
Court's reliance on technicalities would have been accorded
little legitimacy in the face of everyone's common sense
assumption that in electing a president, the right to vote
should trump such trivialities.
But it didn't happen. Instead, something quite silly
happened-namely, that with the entire country focused on
what would be said before the Supreme Court, Gore's lawyers
said something that nobody could understand. At the very
moment when the simplest of arguments would have mobilized
and united Gore's national base, his lawyers took a position
before the Court that excluded all non-Florida voters, and was
in any case incomprehensible to anyone except the lawyer/law-
professor talking heads trying in vain to explain eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century technicalities to a baffled population
who thought this was about the right to vote.
Why? The answer to this question is the answer to the
election itself, to why the Court thought it could get involved,
why it did, and why it correctly sensed it could get away with




The answer is that over the course of the last twenty
years, beginning with the collapse of the social movements of
the 1960s and the election of Ronald Reagan, the Right has
successfully and gradually capitalized on the doubt pervading
the forces of social transformation in such a way as to make
people lose faith in the existence of a hopeful and idealistic
universal public sphere in which there is a "We"--an activist
and more-or-less united public community-struggling for a
better world against the fearful forces of the status quo.
II. THE REAGAN REVOLUTION
The heart of the Reagan Revolution was a sort of
snapping or reversal of the public energy that had given rise to
the Labor movement of the 1930s, the New Deal, and the
multiple and overlapping movements of the 1960s (including
the civil rights movement, the student/anti-war movement, the
women's movement, the gay-and-lesbian movement, and
multiple other transformative efforts). Although all of these
movements continue to have positive effects on the larger
society, in their universal "movement" dimension they had
begun by the late 1970s to be pervaded by what I would call
ontological doubt-by a rotating loss of faith or confidence in
their capacity to fundamentally transform the world. The
dynamics that brought about this worldwide loss of confidence
are complex, and I have explored them elsewhere.' But
conservatives in America, who had begun to really organize
against the ideas-all of the ideas-of the Left following the
defeat of Barry Goldwater in 1964, were able to seize on this
collective doubt and turn it decisively to their advantage. To
use a simple but compelling Freudian metaphor, they were
able to turn the wrath of the cultural superego against the
communal longings of the id.
In the public political sphere, their Revolution found its
leader in the benign authoritarianism of Ronald Reagan who,
in 1980, was able to unify two idealistic images to forge a new
'7 See Peter Gabel, How the Left Was Lost: A Eulogy for the Sixties, in PETER
GABEL, THE BANK TELLER AND OTHER ESSAYS ON THE POLITICS OF MEANING 78-82
(2000).
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national and international hegemonic base. One was the
utopian image of the nuclear family, immortalized in the
historical sense of the word in Reagan's "Morning in America"
ad that showed a mother holding her newborn baby and
promising a restoration of the ideal love that conservatives
associate with the family as the only safe location of social
trust. The other was a declaration of ideological war against
the Evil Empire, which in a formal sense referred to the Soviet
Union but symbolically referred to the totality of the
movements of the Left as the source of chaos, division, and
profound psychic danger.
In the legislative sphere, the Revolution took the form of
a new and intense opposition to the entitlement programs,
whose expansion had begun with the triumph of the New Deal
in the 1930s and had continued with the vast expansion of civil
rights and social welfare programs born of the movements of
the 1960s. Government as a carrier of collective hope and care
was replaced by the "army of faceless bureaucrats" from whose
coercive power "we" longed to be free again by "getting the
government off our backs."
But it is in the legal sphere that we find the seeds of
Bush v. Gore. While Reagan's election and persona represented
the hot moment in which the energy that was the Sixties was
reversed, the long-term legitimacy of Reagan's revolution
required a much more drawn-out process of converting the
initial hot political moment into a passively accepted legal
order. This, in turn, required the gradual dismantling of the
political assumptions that had for fifty years supported the
progressive ideals of the activist New Deal state and replacing
them with new conservative assumptions about the nature of
"our constitutional democracy" and the meaning of "the rule of
law" as seen through the lens of the new conservative
worldview. Beginning in the late 1970s with the replacement of
the Warren Court by the Burger Court, this shift in legal
paradigm was gradually implemented over a period of more
than twenty years through three principal doctrinal strategies.
The first of these was the resurgence of "the
jurisprudence of original intention" as central to the process of
constitutional interpretation. When I attended law school in
20021 1149
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the years 1969 through 1972, lip service was always given to
ascertaining the intent of the framers when interpreting the
meaning of the Constitution, but the dominant consensus was
that the intent-of-the-framers' view had long since given way to
the idea that the Constitution was an "evolving document" that
ought to reflect the progressive values inherent in the nation's
developing conception of political morality. That the Commerce
Clause and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
should be interpreted to require, or at least permit, collective
governmental intervention in the service of a new, universally
accepted conception of social justice was more or less taken for
granted as the basis for requiring (or at least upholding)
legislatively-enacted progressive governmental action. But
following Reagan's election in 1980 and continuing with
greater conviction after his re-election in 1984, conservatives-
such as then-Attorney General Ed Meese and neo-conservative
legal intellectuals throughout the legal academy and within
the now established post-Goldwater think tanks like the
Heritage Foundation, Stanford's Hoover Institute, and the
American Enterprise Institute-decisively challenged this
liberal orthodoxy, insisting instead that it was the Original
Intent of the Founding Fathers, and not the views of random
contemporary judges "applying their own moral opinions," that
should guide the interpretive process.
The effect of this largely successful shift to Original
Intent theory was to invoke the great Image of Paternal
Authority to deny the existence of a universally shared,
progressive public sphere that provided a political basis for
left-liberal constitutional interpretation. Never mind that the
drafters of the Constitution were mainly a group of twenty and
thirty-year-olds whose consciousness was shaped in and by the
eighteenth century; they were the "Founding Fathers" whose
sanctity and eternal prescience could be resuscitated with such
force that Reagan could openly ridicule anyone who spoke the
"L-word" ("liberal," for those of you too young to remember) in
support of the constitutionality of liberal entitlement programs
or in support of, say, the public right of workers to picket on
now properly re-privatized property of the owners of malls and
shopping centers.
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The second major shift in legal theory and doctrine
occurred in the realm of so-called private law with the rise of
the Law and Economics movement, providing a new rationale
for limits on judicial and legislative decision making. Against
the progressive claims emerging from the social political
movements of the 1930s and the 1960s that human beings,are
bound together by communal, moral, and ethical values that
must be central to the development of our legal culture, the
Law and Economics movement emerged from the ascendant
conservative intelligentsia. It has sought to empty legal
doctrine of socially-binding moral content and aspirations by
reinstating the primacy of the freedom of the isolated
individual, who must be free to do whatever he or she wants
unless he or she is paid for any legal constraints placed on that
freedom by the community (now reduced to a mere collection of
other isolated individuals).
Although the humanization of the image of the isolated
individual as "he or she" has had ideological power, its true
economic meaning has been to rationalize the unfettered
expansion of global corporate power by serving as a cultural
weapon in support of deregulation. And while in its technical
aspects the Law and Economics movement has had only a
limited direct effect on the discourse of judicial opinions (with
notable exceptions such as Judge Richard Posner of the
Seventh Circuit), it has become the dominant ideology in
American law schools; it has provided the ideological
foundation for near-universal pre-eminence of cost-benefit
analysis in corporate and legislative decision making; and it
has deeply influenced the increasing dissolution of the use of
moral discourse in common-law decision making in such
private law areas as contracts, torts, property, and
corporations. In the context of the gradual legalization of the
Reagan Revolution, it has contributed importantly to the
disintegration of popular belief in the existence of a legally
recognizable and public moral community by supporting the
image that, apart from the sanctity of the private family and
equally private religious affiliations, "we" are a nation of




The third major doctrinal shift that has served to
gradually legalize the Reagan Revolution-and the one of most
direct relevance to understanding the Supreme Court's
interpretive strategy in Bush v. Gore and to the political
capacity of the Court majority to decide the 2000 election in the
way that it did without a popular revolt-has been the rise of
the "new federalism." Emerging originally in the jurisprudence
of the Burger Court in the late 1970s' 8 and with greater
confidence following Reagan's first election, the new federalism
has been, at one level, simply a return to giving much greater
deference to states' rights in constitutional interpretation. But
in a deeper sense, the doctrine signaled a shift in the official
imagery within American legal culture of how "we" are
politically constituted as "a people" within the meaning of the
Constitution as an authoritative document, a shift to a kind of
eighteenth-century idea of the nation as a confederation of
sovereign and separate groupings (or states) who have
reluctantly granted limited powers to the whole (the federal
government).
Originally, of course, the states did emerge out of the
colonies as organic groups divided from one another by
geography, culture, religious conviction, economy, and even to
some extent language. As such, they were understandably
reluctant to subordinate their group integrity and sovereignty
to a remote national government-that is, a remote national
president, legislature, and court system-which, although in
principle "representative" in nature, might well come to use its
overarching power as the spokesperson for the United States to
threaten the moral authority and self-sovereignty of each state.
18 I foretold the political meaning of the rise of the new federalism and its
relationship to "legalizing" the Reagan Revolution in The Mass Psychology of the New
Federalism: How the Burger Court's Political Imagery Legitimizes the Privatization of
Everyday Life, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV 263 (1984), in which I wrote:
The Court's aim is precisely to make the New Right constitutional...
by reconstituting the existing hierarchy-system within an imaginary
framework that conforms to a new 'intent of the framers.' For in the
long run it is only by transforming the recent wave of right-wing
activism into a passively accepted legal order that the new
conservatism can become a genuinely dominant ideology in the way
that democratic liberalism has been for most of our recent history.
Id. at 270 (emphasis in the original).
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The role of the electoral college in selecting a national
president, with its allocation of two senatorial votes to each
state regardless of population and its guarantee of a
disproportionate voice in presidential selection to smaller
states, reflects precisely this concern (among other concerns,
including a fear of popular democracy) about the potential
"tyrannical" imposition of an alien national power upon the
sovereign states who were the source of that power.
But the rise of the new federalism over the last twenty
years has no authentic relationship to this historical reality of
eighteenth-century life. Virtually no one today feels
distinctively identified in the eighteenth-century sense with
the state as one's organic group. On the contrary, the political
history of the last 200 years has been the growing association
of democracy with belonging to one nation, to one culturally
diverse but nevertheless economically, politically, and
culturally integrated group called the United States of
America. Wars, technology, geographical mobility,
immigration, the socio-economic development of an integrated
capitalist market following increasingly uniform legal rules
and norms, the development of national social movements
transcending regions as well as states, and many other
historical influences have forged a new and concrete historical
reality that has decisively subordinated the state as the locus
of group-identity and belonging to our national identity, to
"being an American."
Thus we invest far more meaning in national elections
than state elections and attribute far greater emotional and
political importance to American citizenship than to often
transient state citizenship. It would be absurd to claim that the
core meaning of participation in our constitutional democracy
today derives from our connection with the state-based
identifications underlying the confederation-based conception
of strictly limited federal power of 1789.
The rise of a new federalism which rests on this claim of
state-based identifications as the basis of constitutional
democracy must therefore be understood as a largely successful
attempt to resuscitate the image of 1789 federalism and to
imbue the image with the same mystique of cultural authority
2002] 1153
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that has been projected onto the Founding Fathers and the
search for their Original Intent. These images draw their
fantasy power from the rituals of our social conditioning since
childhood, from the pledge of allegiance to the venerated
annual telling of our origin story in childhood civics and
American history classes, to the sanctified repetition of the
names of the Founding Fathers (the side flap of my cereal box
once boasted, "TOTALTM brings you Founding Father James
Madison"), to the awe and sense of idolatry attached to the
Constitution itself as a hallowed document in a glass case
whose ideas are somehow "above" those of us mere mortals who
have followed those who penned them.
If we recall that what we are analyzing here is the
legalization of a conservative revolution designed to reverse
actual flesh-and-blood social movements aiming to give
fundamentally new meanings to who "we" are, new meanings
to the "constitution" of our political and moral bond, the use of
authoritative cultural images that we have all been
conditioned to feel we are supposed to invest with "belief' is the
legal analogue to Reagan's "Morning in America" ad. In the
context of the Reagan Revolution and its aftermath, these
authoritative and reassuring images seized upon the
anxiety that had come to pervade a real world beset
by political/moral/cultural/generational/economic/racial/sexual
conflict, especially as collective doubt came to corrode the
idealism of the movement that had both generated this conflict
through its transformative impulse and vision and given the
movement in all its diversity its transcendent and hopeful
unity. Because of their power in our shared cultural memory,
these images can be and were appealed to in order to persuade
"Americans" to come home.
In sum, the common aim of the resuscitation of Original
Intent theory, the Law and Economics movement, and the new
federalism has been to employ authoritative group fantasies
about the origins of America (as the political group to which we
each belong) in the service of erasing the constitutional
legitimacy of a universal public sphere that leaders like Martin
Luther King Jr. and the social movements of the 1930s and
1960s claimed was the very essence of true "constitutional"
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politics. It was in that universal public sphere that moral
questions about our common group life were and are contested.
By mobilizing millions of people in the name of "We the
People," social change movements became the living
embodiments of democratic ideals as they physically and
spiritually occupied this public sphere and challenged the
political legitimacy of existing arrangements and constitutional
doctrines by seeking to give them a new and progressive moral
content.
III. THE COLLAPSE OF SOCIALISM
In its temporarily successful effort to reverse that
energy, the central element of the conservative legal strategy
has been to close down that public sphere. The core image of
America projected by the new conservative legal order is that of
an individualistic society characterized by a private sphere
driven by material self-interest and a de-politicized public
sphere comprised of morally unconnected and passive citizens,
obedient and deferential to the strict authority of their
Fathers. The significance of the "legal" character of this image
is that calling it "Law" makes it "binding" on our collective
national consciousness. Its gradual internalization has
legitimized the privatization of American culture post-1980
and has contributed decisively to confirming the collective
doubt to which I referred earlier, the sense that if you get
involved and go out into public claiming your democratic
authority to change the world, no one will be there for you
because there is no longer any "there" there, no longer any
"constitutional space" where Martin Luther King Jr. and
millions of other Americans once stood.
To this legal history one other central fact must be
added, an event that cleared the field for the more or less
unchecked development of this conservative world view. That
event was the collapse of the Soviet Union and socialism as an
idea. For 150 years, the idea of socialism had been the
dominant worldwide metaphor for the possibility of a
fundamentally different world based on community rather
than self-interest and the separation of self and other. Every
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progressive social movement of the twentieth century in some
way defined itself in relation to the idea of socialism because
however much labor or women or the 1960s counter-culture or
environmentalists or any progressive person agreed or
disagreed with the specific tenets of Marx, socialism's basic
affirmation that the world could and should be based on social
connection and egalitarian community provided a crucial link
between any particular progressive reform within the "Whole
world" of capitalism and the possibility of a radically different
universal social vision and "whole world" toward which
particular limited reforms were aiming.
In addition, the fact that the Soviet Union and the
socialist bloc actually existed and had been able to mount a
protracted long-term challenge to the capitalist ethos all over
the world provided the idea of socialism with at least some
embodied reality, however distorted, anti-democratic, and even
brutal that reality was in its existing incarnation. As events
have shown since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, even
the modern Democratic Party had depended since its origins in
the New Deal on being able to define itself as the alternative,
liberal-democratic path to the humane social vision to which
socialism aspired. Without the moral ideal of community that
socialism as a metaphor had come to stand for, and without
being able to make the claim that it offers the gradual
democratic path toward that ideal that is the correct
alternative to totalitarianism, the Democratic Party has no
anchoring moral world view to distinguish itself from the
Republican's whole-hearted embrace of capitalist self-
interest-except to appear to be the party of half-hearted
capitalist self-interest, which is hardly the basis of a
compelling moral and political vision that one can expect
people to follow.
After Stalinism, Mao's cultural revolution, the Khmer
Rouge, and the direct experience that millions of people had of
the unsafe group dynamics that undermined the (otherwise
wonderful, hopeful!) 1960s, nobody could believe any longer
that seizing economic and political power from private
individuals on behalf of the collective through some apocalyptic
revolution could possibly lead to something better than the
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lives we lead now, however isolated, alienated, and
meaningless they often are. So by the early 1980s, the socialist
idea had lost its capacity to serve as the unifying
communitarian counter-vision that had made the Left a
powerful and morally compelling force, and when the principal
embodiments of "really existing socialism" vanished from the
earth in 1989, the ideology of individualism appeared to have
"won." The effect of this was both to give increased legitimacy
to capitalism's economic, cultural, and political expansion on
an increasingly global level and to greatly weaken the ability of
the longing for community (a longing which exists in everyone)
to even be seen or heard by the other, much less to be
mobilized into a movement based on that longing that could
enter public space and make moral claims on behalf of a
universal, transformative alternative to an apparently
vindicated conservative worldview.
The void left by the collapse of socialism as the
dominant political metaphor for community intensified the
ability of the American conservative legal intelligentsia to
carry out its doctrinal disintegration of the constitutionally-
binding public morality that the progressive movements of the
1930s and 1960s had fought for. There is no better testament
to the effectiveness of their effort to gradually convert the
Reagan Revolution into a new legal order supported by a new
and widely accepted conservative "common sense" than the
inability of Bill Clinton to make his long presidency stand for
anything. Elected and enormously popular precisely because of
his ability to recognize and validate our universal longing for
community, a capacity that arose in significant part from the
effect on him of the civil rights and other movements of his
youth, Clinton was forced to rely throughout his presidency on
personal charisma and polling data that demonstrated his
"private" popularity among otherwise disconnected individual
voters to enable him to survive politically in a public sphere
totally dominated by his conservative opponents.
Bill Clinton embodied hope, idealism, and communal
aspirations-as the cich goes, "he made you feel cared
about"-but he could not speak for this ideal and aspiration in
the name of a coherent moral and political vision. That is why
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the Right was able to crush his initially popular call for
universal health care; he had no coherent social vision with
which to fight for it in a public sphere now dominated by an
individualist political world view, a worldview which the
Clintons ended up deferring to by basing their legislative
strategy on seeking support from the American Medical
Association, the private insurance companies, and amoral,
implausible claims of cost-efficiency.
Although things might have been different if Clinton
had been able to imagine a new, emerging, spiritual-ecological-
communal successor to the now-defeated Left and liberal
materialist alternatives, he was, in the end, able to do no more
than to cut his party's losses by rejecting the failed communal
metaphors of the past ("the era of big government is over"). In
an act of true political schizophrenia, he used his personal
capacity to evoke warmth and idealistic hope in the service of
expanding the globalization of capital and international trade
agreements, like NAFTA, that consolidated the power of
international, private corporate power. In response to the
uninterrupted progress of the conservative ascendancy in the
social, political, and legal sphere, he consistently took positions
that actually accepted the conservative viewpoint and merely
sought to restrain its influence, defending affirmative action,
for example, with such morally toothless slogans as "mend it,
don't end it," and signing the Republican welfare-reform bill in
return for temporary concessions by the Right to ease their
assault on remaining elementary legal protections for labor
and the environment.
Increasingly during the course of his eight years in
office, he was reduced to defining his legacy as "having
presided over the greatest economic expansion in history," an
expansion that demonstrated America's ability under his
leadership to "compete and win in the world market." Taken as
a whole, this record actually strengthened public acceptance of
the continuing normalization of the Reagan Revolution,
precisely because it showed that even a popular liberal
Democrat seemed to accept the inevitability of its basic tenets,
and even measured his own success by conservative "free
market" criteria.
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IV. THE WEIGHT OF HISTORY
By the time of the 2000 presidential election, the
Democratic Party no longer felt capable of even appealing to its
own constituencies on the basis of a progressive social vision.
Having been forced to kneel at the Republican altar for so long,
even former participants in the movements of the 1960s like
Bill and Hillary Clinton abandoned the transformative
convictions that had shaped them (and that were still visible in
both of them as late as 1992), not because they no longer cared,
but because they had nothing to say, no way to translate their
social idealism into a new political idea.
Non-movement liberals like Al Gore, who were
influenced by the 1960s but remained fundamentally loyal to
mainstream political values, more fully retreated to the half-
hearted conservative worldview. So 2000 found Gore running a
presidential campaign that was merely a pragmatic "less bad
than Bush" laundry-list of disconnected, centrist proposals, like
prescription drug benefits for the elderly, increasing
standardized testing to prepare the work force for the new
global marketplace (but requiring fewer such tests than Bush),
and touting "cost-effectiveness" and a greater ability to
correctly "add up the numbers" as the basis for distinguishing
his Social Security and Medicare proposals from those of Bush.
Behind the moral impotence of the Gore campaign was
a now thoroughly conditioned acceptance that whatever
transformative political ideals once defined his own life
personally and the convictions of his party were now
irrelevant. These ideals could no longer move "We the People"
to leave their private houses and private self-interested
concerns and enter the public sphere to provide a popular base
for a contagious and winning campaign. As a result of this long
process of devolution that I have described and the popular
internalization of a politically passive, conservative political
worldview, Gore rightly understood that while he might win
the election by a lesser-of-two-evils campaign if he could get his
already organized constituencies to get out and vote, he could
not rely on anyone to be there for him if he invoked F.D.R.,
Martin Luther King Jr., and the great egalitarian and
communal traditions of his party's past.
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Thus when the amazing occurred on Election Day and
woke up the American electorate from the now thoroughly
legitimated and seemingly inevitable prisons of their private
and isolated routines, Gore was ill-prepared to mobilize a
suddenly intensely politicized national community. Like
someone who hasn't gone to the gym for twenty years and is
then suddenly expected to be in shape, Gore and his advisors
were themselves so demobilized by twenty years of political
and moral inactivity that they were incapable of grasping the
opportunity that the accident of the election results and the
ensuing six-week national debate about the meaning of
democracy had handed to them. All over the country, friends
were talking intensely on the phone and strangers were talking
intensely on street corners about Florida and the right to vote
and Katherine Harris's attempts to stop the vote count. High-
school and college students actually focused for the first time in
their lives on the electoral college and its ability to trump the
popular vote, intensely discussing and struggling to
understand the seemingly anti-democratic justifications for it.
Within a matter of days, a constitutional democracy
that had come to see itself as but a collection of privatized,
passive, and disconnected individuals suddenly emerged into a
fledgling, but genuine, political community hurled into common
public engagement by the threat that even the right to vote-
the very foundation of American democracy won across
centuries through an intense moral struggle and at the cost of
many lives-might be denied in determining the outcome of a
national presidential election whose democratic legitimacy is
supposedly entirely based on it. Within a few days after
November 7, and for a period lasting almost six weeks,
Americans were galvanized by the one moral imperative and
shared moral bond that even the most conservative
government could not take away from them-the shared moral
certainty that their government's legitimacy rests on the will of
the people. While the act of voting every two or four years can
often seem to the isolated individuaf like the most minuscule
act of public self-assertion, the idea that the right to vote could
be taken away was a challenge to the deeply held moral ideal
of democratic self-determination. During the period from
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November 7 until December 12, when the Supreme Court
ended the matter, the challenge to that moral ideal was
sufficient to allow the false "we" of a deferential and isolated
people to begin to emerge into a real "we--an active, collective
presence ready to demand its sovereign birthright.
If we now see this dramatic period following November
7 in the historical context that I have described, we can
understand the collective "political unconscious" underlying
this drama as a struggle between conflicting impulses existing
within each individual and the national community as a whole.
One was the fearful impulse that had sought for twenty years
to block the desire for social connection and for a just,
egalitarian, and erotic community from again becoming a
public force. The other was the utopian democratic impulse-
the Walt Whitman impulse in "I Hear America Singing"-that
was accidentally and spontaneously released by the closeness
of the election and the controversy about how it would be
resolved.
The fearful impulse was reflected in the frantic efforts
by Katherine Harris, James Baker, and others to stop the
Florida vote count immediately by strictly interpreting a trivial
deadline for certification and by constantly repeating to a
suddenly aroused and empowered national community the
mantra that "there had already been recount after recount" in
order to prevent the manual counting of uncounted votes. This
fearful impulse also was reflected in the panicky assertion by
some across the country, but especially those in the Bush
campaign, that "we've got to know who our president is." I call
these "fearful impulses" because they were plainly irrational-
there was no pressing need to know the outcome; at stake was
the outcome of a national presidential election, the most
important single incarnation of our democratic process. In the
past Congress has counted state electoral votes received as late
as January 6 (the day of the counting).19 The Constitution and
federal law even provide for a custodial presidency by the
Speaker of the House if there is a delay beyond January 20 in
19 Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics,
110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1421 n.55 (2001).
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accurately determining a presidential election's outcome.0
Florida's certification deadline was obviously intended merely
to provide a uniform date to guide and coordinate in normal
circumstances a schedule for statewide counts, rather than
having some substantive importance that might justify
certifying an inaccurate result.
But it was the palpable pressing need to "know who our
president is" that best reveals the nature of the fear, a fear
analogous to, say, "not knowing who our Founding Fathers
are." It was the fear that the closure and de-politicization of
public space that had been so central to the political imagery
underlying the new Right's "constitutional interpretation"
would be threatened the longer that the absence of a
presidential authority figure left this public space open. This
was especially true because the spontaneous release of the
right-to-vote popular democratic impulse was creating a sense
of passion and excitement with unknown consequences.
Without quickly "installing a president" and normalizing the
nation's political structure, no one could be sure what would
bubble up in the vacuum. Thirteen-year-olds might start
asking their parents just what the point of this electoral college
is, and didn't Gore win the popular vote, and how can
Katherine Harris claim o be objective when she was co-chair of
the Florida Bush for President Committee, and what about
those African Americans I heard were intimidated by the
police? The longer the political space remained opened, the
greater the risk to the legitimacy of a conservative world view
that for twenty years had relied on the passive acceptance of
paternal authority.
However, it was Gore, and not the Republicans, who
posed the greatest obstacle to the success of the popular
democratic impulse. Having long since left behind the days
when he liked to smoke pot, grew his hair long, and went off
with his girlfriend in a canoe on a 1960s-inspired journey in
search of the meaning of life, Gore had run a campaign that
remained well within the reigning conservative paradigm,
offering no progressive moral vision of any kind. That in itself
made it difficult to rally behind him in the post-election contest
20 3 U.S.C. § 19(a) (2000).
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as the idealistic champion of the people and of popular
democracy. But what made the situation worse was that he
had been so demobilized and co-opted by the devolution of
idealism of the previous twenty years that he himself did not
realize in the post-election period (and I'm sure could not
believe or trust) that the people who generated his substantial
popular vote majority were trying to cast off the enforced
isolation and political inertia of those twenty years and
mobilize to fight for him in the name of democracy, for the
right to vote. Most Americans thought the Republican efforts to
stop the recount were wrong, thought that Katherine Harris's
repeated attempts to stop the count on the basis of a purported
objective and neutral exercise of her discretion were patently
absurd, and they believed that, with a fair and full count, Gore
had probably won.
But instead of emerging publicly and speaking
passionately on behalf of democracy to and for his own voters,
a known majority of the country, Gore assumed the same
posture as Bush, behaving like a remote presidential
candidate, making occasional formal public statements at
which he took no questions, insisting that the vote-count
question was a legal matter to be handled by his lawyers and
the courts, and otherwise holing-up in the vice president's
mansion and allowing rare photo-ops of family touch-football
games. Instead, he could have come out and thanked the
working people and women and minorities who had poured out
to vote for him after working all day in crucial cities like
Philadelphia and Los Angeles and Miami, exercising their
democratic right to vote for which men like Martin Luther
King Jr. fought and for which so many had lost their lives. Had
he linked their exercise of that right to his fight to have every
vote counted in Florida, Gore would have seized the high moral
ground, mobilized his constituencies, and thoroughly
discredited the efforts of James Baker and the Bush team to
use every method-including the threat of physical violence in
the case of the Republican-organized riot outside the Miami-
Dade county registrar's office-to impede democracy's most
sacred principle. He also would have made the Florida state
legislature's threatened decision to simply appoint a slate of
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Bush electors, irrespective of the outcome of the popular vote,
appear shamefully undemocratic, rather than being legitimate
as technically legal under Article II, Section 1 of the
Constitution.2 By opting instead to try to "act presidential" and
turn the whole matter over to highly paid lawyers, Gore
sacrificed his chance to seize the moral initiative on a matter
that he himself deeply believed in, and allowed the media to
characterize him as no different from Bush, with both sides
represented by an army of lawyers and both motivated simply
by their own self-interest. He also left his popular majority
rudderless while significantly marginalizing the political
importance of his substantial popular-vote victory. By failing to
see that his true political community were the actual people
who had just voted for him, rather than the version of the
people represented in the image of constitutional democracy
prevailing in the now decisively dominant conservative world
view, he actually created the conditions that legitimized his
own defeat.
V. WHO ARE "THE PEOPLE"?
This last point deserves emphasis and provides us with
the most important lesson to be drawn from the 2000 election
regarding the relationship between politics and law. When the
United States Supreme Court made its first intervention in
deciding the outcome of the election by taking certiorari in
Bush v. Palm Beach County,' it informed the lawyers for both
sides that it wanted them to address the question of whether
the Florida Supreme Court's first decision to extend the time
for the initial recount through the Thanksgiving weekend
violated either Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution or
the series of federal statutes in Title 3 of the U.S. Code
1 U.S. CONST. art. II § I states:
Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of
senators and representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an
Office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an
elector.
22 Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 1004 (2000).
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governing the federal certification of state electors to the
electoral college.' That request indicated that the Court
majority intended to evaluate the legality of the Florida court's
decision by measuring it against a version of how "the people"
were "constituted" according to political values prevailing
between 100 and 200 years ago.
In doing so, the Court was calculating, consciously or
unconsciously, that the American people of today, who had just
voted in a democratic election for the nation's highest office
and had elected one candidate by a 500,000-vote majority,
would nonetheless accept the legitimacy of a decision by the
Court to decide the election in favor of the other candidate
based on its interpretation of a version of the democratic will of
the American people drawn from the legal materials of a much
earlier and very different time. For example, the dates in the
federal statutory provisions regarding certification of state
electors, one of which the Court eventually used to award the
presidency to Bush without allowing completion of the Florida
vote-count, were based on how long it would take to deliver
lists of electors from the several states by horseback to
Washington D.C.2 Similarly, the political values shaping the
version of "the people" reflected in Article II Section 1-the
basis for the Court's unanimous reversal of the Florida
Supreme Court in the first case' and the concurring opinion by
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist in the second case2-
would have denied the right to vote to a very large percentage
of Gore's voters.
The only reason that the Court majority felt they could
take the risk of intervening on this basis was that they
guessed, at the time of their first intervention, that they could
use their fetishized legal authority as the supreme interpreters
of the Intent of the Founding Fathers to superimpose their
eighteenth-century version of the people on the people
themselves, even though the real human beings comprising the
people as a living, democratic, national community had just
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
24 Larry Lipman, Challenge Planned to Electoral College Congress to Make
Count Ofial Today, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 6, 2001, at A3.
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76.
26 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112.
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spoken. From the standpoint of any present-day understanding
of the political meaning of popular democracy, it was ridiculous
to assert that the Florida Supreme Court was prohibited from
allowing a few extra days to obtain an accurate vote-count that
would determine the outcome of a national election. Of course
it was permissible, and even essential out of respect for the will
of voters nationwide, to extend a more-or-less arbitrary
counting deadline to figure out, in accordance with the
statutorily expressed policy of the Florida legislature, which
candidate the people of Florida had really voted for. Yet by
channeling the political meaning of constitutional democracy
into a legal framework drawn from an era when some states
did not even allow popular votes in presidential elections, and
by then commandingly posing supposedly knotty and abstract
legal questions that "smuggled in" these antiquated political
assumptions while appearing to be both rational and complex
from a legal point of view, the Court majority guessed it could
use its twenty years of accumulated conservative cultural
capital to "awe" the people into another, imaginary, political
world. Because the Supreme Court's authority is precisely to
declare what political world is also the legal world, its opinion
would be accepted as binding on the community as a whole.
Had Gore and his liberal lawyers been able to see and
trust the reality of his own national democratic base-by
speaking before the Court for them on the basis of the
universal moral ideals of the present day embodied in the right
of everyone to vote, and emphasizing in the name of leaders
like Martin Luther King Jr. precisely the overturning of states'
rights restrictions on that highest of democratic values that
had marked the Court's jurisprudence since at least the Civil
War-he might have mobilized his really-existing People in a
way that would have overwhelmed the images of the "people"
relied on by Bush and the Court majority. Against him, Gore,
would have had the twenty years of loss of faith that would
have made it difficult for his popular majority to believe there
was still a hopeful public space to emerge into, and he would
have had the media, which until such a popular democratic
reality succeeded in emerging, would have projected the
inevitability of the Court's image of Authority to speak for the
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People (consider the media's fascination with the awesome
architecture of the Supreme Court's chamber, the fact that we
the people were going to be "allowed" for the first time to hear
their allegedly devastating questioning of the lawyers, and the
frantic scramble to get seats for the oral arguments in which
the Great Ones would appear in their full regalia, emerging
from their secret and sanctified private chambers where their
supposedly majestic conversations about the nature of our
constitutional democracy occur, conversations which the
average persons actually constituting that democracy could
certainly not understand). Overcoming the cultural power of
these images would have been difficult; so long as the post-
election contest remained mainly a media event in which
people could only connect as a people by watching television,
these images provided powerful psychological support for the
twenty-years-in-the-making closure and even erasure of the
popular-democratic space that the Gore majority would have to
reclaim. But had he and Lawrence Tribe and David Boies stood
up boldly in the name of Martin Luther King Jr. on behalf of
the right to vote, I think the Gore forces would have succeeded
in allowing the present reality of the people to defeat the long-
dead version of the people on which the Bush forces and the
Court's conservative majority depended.
But instead of standing up for voting rights, Gore and
his lawyers meekly pleaded for states' rights,27 the traditional
Republican metaphor that has been used for centuries to deny
working people, women, and African Americans the right to
vote. Of course, in their public statements outside the legal
sphere, Gore and his spokespeople did invoke the right to vote
as the basis for their call for a full and fair Florida vote count.'
But by severing this political claim from their legal claim, they
decisively undermined their ability to claim that the right to
vote was not just their view of the right principle to be
followed, but was also the universally binding moral ideal that
Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 50.
Vice President Al Gore, News Conference on Florida Election Lawsuit (Nov.




the Court was obligated to recognize as binding upon a
national community founded upon the will of the people.
So enveloped were Gore and his lawyers in their own
belief in the power of the conservative worldview, so weakened
was their conviction that there really was a People out here to
support their own political viewpoint, that they allowed
themselves to think that they had to argue from a position of
weakness: to cling to the hope that by dutifully framing their
legal argument in the antiquated version of the People that the
Court majority had for so long successfully been constructing,
they might have a chance of pleading with either Kennedy or
O'Connor to vote with them and thus eke out a five-to-four
victory on states' rights grounds. By doing so, they effectively
limited the meaning of the legal debate to morally trivial,
technical legal questions affecting only Floridians, and
dissolved the emerging unity of their own national democratic
base by depriving us of our ability to claim constitutional
legitimacy-in the name of our own national democratic
majority-to demand that the Florida vote count proceed.29
Once Gore and his lawyers deferred in this way to the
conservative worldview and its version of who the People were,
we were lost. Ironically, by the time the Court finally ended the
election in its second decision on December 12, 2000, o the
Court itself had to bow to the national popular pressure that
had built up on its own on behalf of the pre-eminence of the
right to vote over the six-week period of nationwide political
debate and shifted its rationale from their initial strict reading
of Article II, Section 1, to a rationale based on equal protection
theory.3 Undoubtedly, the Court majority knew that the two
Court decisions read together were incoherent and
unsupportable. But they also knew that there was no longer
any possibility of a unified public majority empowered by a
publicly articulated sense of constitutional entitlement that
could do anything about it.
Even if Gore could not have changed the outcome of the
Court decisions and of the election itself by uniting his political
" See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S at 98.30 Id.
3 Id. at 103-10.
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and legal claim under the transcendent banner of voting rights,
he would, by doing so, have posed a powerful challenge with
significant popular support to the long conservative assault on
the very existence of a socially-connected, national community
demanding legal recognition in the name of the highest of
democratic values. Instead of the political demobilization and
universal isolation that envelops and separates us from each
other today, we and they would know that we exist, that we
claim to be legitimately "constituted," and that by quite a large
margin we had and have the votes.

